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Abstract
Quantum measurement predictions are consistent with relativity for macro-
scopic observations, but there is no consensus on how to explain this consistency
in fundamental terms. The prevailing assumption is that the relativistic struc-
ture of spacetime should provide the framework for any microphysical account.
This bias is due, in large part, to our intuitions about local causality, the idea
that all physical processes propagate through space in a continuous manner. I
argue that relativity is not a guarantor of local causality, and is not about on-
tological features of spacetime. It is, rather, an expression of the observational
equivalence of spacetime descriptions of physical processes. This observational
equivalence is due to the essentially probabilistic nature of quantum theory.
1 Relativity Is Not Based On Local Causality
In order to get from here to there, you have to pass through points in between. This
intuitively obvious notion is fundamental to the implicit model of the external world
that shapes our thoughts and actions. Other vertebrate species also exhibit behavior
that appears to be guided by analogous cognitive processes. I recall watching the
children of some friends use a laser pointer to tease their cat. They would shine the
laser spot on the floor in front of the cat, move it around enough to get the cat’s
attention, and induce her to start tracking it. They would then jerk the spot of light
to a completely different place in the room, leaving the pet totally bewildered after
witnessing a seemingly coherent object jump discontinuously through space.
The expectation that things move through space in a continuous fashion is very
deeply ingrained. Developmental psychologists have attempted to determine to what
extent it might arise from innate neural processes.1 No matter what one thinks about
the relative contributions of heredity and learning in generating this belief, it clearly
plays an enormous role in guiding our everyday life and in the ways that we think
about physics.
∗email: gillise@provide.net
1See, for example, Spatiotemporal continuity and the perception of causality in infants, by
Leslie[1].
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Its place in our world view and its influence on the rise of modern science are
evident in Newton’s efforts to justify and reconcile gravitational action at a distance
with the received belief that causes are transmitted by contact through some medium.
It is not completely certain how he thought that the reconciliation was to be achieved,
but he clearly acknowledges the prevailing notion in his 1693 letter to Bentley[2]:
”...That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that
one body may act upon another at a distance, through a vacuum, without
the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and
force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity,
that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty
of thinking, can ever fall into it.”
The success of Newton’s theories of mechanics and gravitation led people to accept
the idea of action at a distance, at least provisionally. However, the intuition that all
processes must propagate in a continuous manner is so compelling that the principle
of local causality gradually reasserted itself in physics. The concept of gravitational
potential, employed by Euler, Lagrange, and Laplace hints at the idea of a field
defined at all points in space. In the nineteenth century, the work of Faraday and
Maxwell fully established the idea of continuously propagating electromagnetic fields,
and suggested to some the existence of a luminiferous ether. It also led to a clear
conflict with Newtonian mechanics, which was resolved by Einstein’s Special Theory
of Relativity.
Einstein’s theory revolutionized our ideas about time, with radical consequences
for the concepts of mass, motion, and energy. However, it also reestablished physics
on the venerable principle of local causality. In this respect, it was a very conservative
revolution.
Einstein apparently cemented the triumph of this traditional principle with the
development of the General Theory of Relativity, which is able to explain the propa-
gation of gravitational influences in a locally causal manner.
Quantum mechanics was developed at roughly the same time as the theories of
relativity. Although he made major contributions to its development, Einstein was
unhappy with some of the central features of quantum theory, in particular, its prob-
abilistic nature. In his paper with Podolsky and Rosen[3] he argued that some of the
predicted correlations for entangled systems would require ’spooky action at a dis-
tance’, if one assumed that the effects were truly nondeterministic. The conclusion
drawn in the EPR paper was that quantum mechanics needed to be ’completed’ by
a fully deterministic theory.
Bell turned the EPR argument around[4, 5]. He showed that the correlations
between some specific pairs of outcomes of spacelike-separated measurements on en-
tangled particles are too large to be explained by the assumption that the results are
determined by some factors in the common past of the measured systems.2 These
2Aside from superdeteministic explanations.
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nonclassical ”super” correlations appear to indicate that the particular result of one
of the measurements acts across a spacelike interval to change the probabilities of the
outcomes of the other measurement. There are real superluminal effects.
So why cannot these effects be used to send superluminal signals? The reason is
that one cannot control the outcomes of the local measurement. They are essentially
probabilistic. When all of the possible results are summed over, the total probability
of any particular distant outcome is unchanged. It is a striking result that the Born
probability rule[6], and only the Born probability rule, is able to maintain this con-
sistency. Any slight deviation from it would enable superluminal information trans-
mission. It is not hard to see this, given a sufficient number of identically prepared
entangled systems. This is, of course, also a consequence of Gleason’s theorem[7].
This situation is sometimes described as demonstrating the ”peaceful coexistence”
of quantum theory and relativity[8, 9]. In a number of commentaries, it even seems to
take on a rather miraculous air. But, is it not much more straightforward to assume
that the impossibility of sending superluminal signals, and, hence, relativity, is a
consequence of the fundamentally probabilistic nature of the elementary interactions
that constitute measurements?
Note that the same line of argument that shows how the Born rule prevents super-
luminal signalling also shows that it is impossible to say which of the two (or more)
measurements is affecting the other. In other words, there is no observable sequence
of these spacelike-separated events. This is one of the fundamental characteristics of
the relativistic description of spacetime.
Einstein and his colleagues set out to show that if physical theory retained its non-
deterministic elements, it would have to countenance nonlocal actions. Bell showed
that the inclusion of nonlocal effects is unavoidable, and subsequent analysis[10, 11,
12, 13] has demonstrated that the nondeterministic nature of these effects is essential
to the prevention of superluminal signalling. It is ironic that relativity is preserved
by the very property of quantum theory that Einstein found so disturbing - indeter-
minism.
2 Making Sense of Signal Causality
We have misunderstood what relativity is really about. This is a result of the histor-
ical path to its discovery, our pretheoretic biases, and the elegance of the theory. Its
two great classical instantiations, Maxwell’s electromagnetism and general relativity,
capture our intuitions about continuous propagation so beautifully that we perceive
local causality as a manifestation of the metric structure of spacetime. This per-
ception fosters an attitude that, no matter how serious a problem is, any proposed
solution should fit comfortably within this structure.3 However, even without taking
into account the challenges posed by quantum theory, there are reasons to question
3At least until we approach the Planck scale
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the completeness of the classical relativistic world view. The infinite self-energy and
radiation reaction problems of electrodynamics have provoked proposals that violate
conventional notions of causality[14]. Solutions of Einstein’s gravitational equation
that approximately describe our universe exhibit generic singularities, where space-
time and the laws of physics break down[15]. Since physicists have worked on these
issues for roughly a century, one might start to wonder whether there are inherent
logical limits to the notion of local causality, analogous to the limits on provability in
mathematics.4
In any case Bell’s analysis has forced us to recognize that not everything that
happens in our world can be explained in terms of locally propagating processes. The
fact that local causality is not the basis for contemporary physics is often obscured
by a failure to distinguish between it and the weaker, more general notion of signal
causality, the prohibition of superluminal information transmission. Local causality
implies signal causality, but signal causality permits superluminal effects, provided
that they are nondeterministic, and in accord with the Born rule.
This more general principle is implemented in quantum field theory as the re-
quirement that spacelike-separated field operators commute[16]. This means that a
measurement made in one location cannot affect the overall probabilities of possible
outcomes of a measurement made in a spacelike-separated region, even though spe-
cific pairs of outcomes exhibit correlations that indicate some kind of linkage across
the spacelike interval between them.
Most quantum field theory texts describe the commutativity requirement as a
causality condition, usually without qualifying it as signal causality. In his book,
Weinberg[17] adopts a somewhat different perspective:
”The point of view taken here is that [the commutativity requirement]
is needed for the Lorentz invariance of the S-matrix, without any ancillary
assumptions about ... causality.”
One might say that while most authors take the requirement as a formal expression of
causality, Weinberg prefers to view it as preserving relativity. These complementary
interpretations highlight the intimate connection between the two principles. It must
be emphasized, however, that the attribution of Lorentz invariance to the S-matrix
does not automatically assign some special ontological status to the Lorentz-invariant
metric of Minkowski spacetime. The S-matrix is a set of theory-laden calculations,
and it reflects a number of properties of the mathematical formalism. If the met-
ric properties of spacetime alone were sufficient to guarantee the Lorentz invariance
of observable quantities, there would be no need for a special postulate to govern
the action of field operators. This additional assumption is aimed at regulating the
nonlocal effects that are implicit in quantum theory.
4This is only an analogy. I am not suggesting that quantum indeterminism is logically linked to
Goedel’s incompleteness theorem
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The S-matrix calculations yield probabilities for measurement outcomes. These
quantities are compared to readings of macroscopic laboratory instruments, and the
meaning of the commutativity requirement in relation to them is clear. However,
problems arise when we try to translate the commutativity condition into a statement
about fundamental physical processes.
This translation problem derives from the way in which contemporary physical
theory is structured. Dynamic equations describing elementary processes are com-
pletely deterministic. Nonlocal, probabilistic effects have been banished to a lawless,
ill-defined border region that lies somewhere between microscopic and macroscopic
realms. This theoretical structure has been incredibly fruitful, but it has also made
it incredibly difficult to understand what it is saying about the world at the most
fundamental level.
This is why Bohr thought that references to macroscopic, classical concepts are
essential to interpret statements about microphysical processes[18, 19]. Bell described
the problem very eloquently[20]:
”More importantly, the ’no signalling...’ notion rests on concepts which
are desperately vague, or vaguely applicable. The assertion that ’we can-
not signal faster than light’ immediately provokes the question:
Who do we think we are?
We who can make ’measurements’...?... chemists, or only physicists,...pocket
calculators, or only main frame computers? ”
Bell raised the possibility that the relation of signal causality to elementary processes
is analogous to that of thermodynamics, but he did not think that this was a promising
approach.
Maudlin[21] has extended Bell’s critique. After acknowledging that the notion of
’signalling’ apparently makes essential reference to human activity, he demonstrates
that the Born probability rule precludes the use of nonlocal quantum effects for this
purpose. However, he goes on to argue that the nonlocal changes in the states of
elementary systems do imply some sort of superluminal transmission of information
to that particular system, even though the information is not, in general, accessible
to any other physical system.
The criticisms of Bell and Maudlin have considerable merit, and they pose a serious
problem for the concept of signal causality. It appears that when we formulate it in
terms of elementary physical processes (rather than human activities) as a prohibition
of superluminal information transmission, it does not really apply to the kinds of
nonlocal quantum effects that we are trying to describe.
To deal with this problem I will try to show that, despite Bell’s reservations,
the relationship of signal causality to elementary processes is analogous to that of
thermodynamics by noting some important parallels between the concepts of ’tem-
perature’ and ’information’. The concept of information that I will use is distinct
from that of Maudlin. It will allow us to define signal causality as the prohibition of
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superluminal information transmission, and it will depend in an essential way on the
nondeterministic nature of elementary processes.
When we say that the temperature in a room is 20o C, we are implying a great
deal about conditions in the room. For example, the room is in thermal equilibrium
- no significant net transfers of energy will take place between adjacent masses of air.
Individual molecules do not have temperatures. They can have almost any energy,
and in a collision with another molecule there is an overwhelming likelihood that a
substantial amount of energy will be exchanged. The concept of temperature applies
to very large collections of molecules that meet the proper conditions. Of course,
the term ’temperature’ is sometimes applied to individual elementary particles as
a synonym for ’energy’. There is an important link between energy and tempera-
ture, but, as just noted, the ascription of a definite temperature implies a number of
relationships among physical systems.
I maintain that Maudlin’s application of the term ’information’ to individual ele-
mentary systems is analogous to ascribing a temperature to a single molecule. What
Maudlin means by ’information’ is a full specification of the parameters required to
characterize an elementary state. This is a perfectly reasonable use of the term, de-
pending on the circumstances, just as talking about the ’temperature’ of individual
particles makes sense in certain contexts. But, as Maudlin emphasizes, this ’informa-
tion’ is not accessible to any other physical systems.
The concept of information is, to a large extent, relational. Physical systems that
can instantiate information must be able to represent the states of other systems, and
to transmit and receive the relevant types of representations. Maudlin’s inaccessible
information clearly lacks these attributes.
To obtain information about the state of a physical system one induces it to
interact with other particles in such a way that correlations are established between
the states of the subject and detector systems. A chain or cascade of correlating
interactions is set up so that the state of the original subject can be represented in a
much larger system. If these interactions were completely deterministic and reversible,
one could generate a complete description of the original state. The reason that
we cannot, in general, obtain such a description is that the elementary interactions
that establish correlations between subject and detector particles are not completely
deterministic.
If we explicitly recognize the nondeterministic behavior at the level of elementary
processes, we can understand why information cannot be transmitted superlumi-
nally. Individual elementary particles can possess a definite state, but they cannot,
by themselves, instantiate information about that state because interactions with
other particles can change the state in a nondeterministic way. There would then be
no faithful, physical representation of the original state. This is the content of the
No-cloning theorem[22]. The preparation of individual particles in definite, known
states requires interaction with very large numbers of other particles. It is only at this
scale, through the full network of correlations that are established, that information
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can be said to exist. Information about a physical system must be fully accessible to
other systems, and it must be reasonably stable against probabilistic changes. This
means that the definition of physical information is a matter of gradation or degree;
but it is still a perfectly objective concept. It is analogous to temperature, which is
perfectly well-defined, even though we do not precisely specify how big a system must
be to achieve thermal equilibrium.
The point is that the limitations on information and on its transmission are ex-
plainable in terms of a basic property of elementary interactions - their probabilistic
nature. As stated above, this issue has been clouded by the fact that contempo-
rary theory does not acknowledge any deviation from complete determinism at this
level. There are a number of reasons for this, but the biggest one is that such an
acknowledgement completely disrupts our understanding of spacetime structure.
3 The Status of Spacetime Structure
It is possible to describe nondeterministic behavior at the level of elementary interac-
tions, at least in a phenomenological way. The linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation
permits nonlocal, probabilistic transfers of amplitude between interacting and non-
interacting branches of the wave function without violating signal causality. The
details have been given elsewhere[23]. The catch is that these hypothesized effects
are both nonlocal and nondeterministic. Nondeterminism entails irreversibility, and
irreversibility implies that the effects must be sequenced. If interactions involving
the same entangled system occur in spacelike-separated regions, there is no way to
account for the sequencing of the nonlocal effects associated with the interactions
simply by reference to the relativistic metric structure.
This apparent conflict with relativity is present in conventional descriptions of
quantum measurement. To see this assume that the wave function of a single particle
has bifurcated into two main branches, and that there is an ideal detector in the
path of each branch. One of the detectors registers the presence of the particle; the
other does not. Suppose that the two measurements are spacelike-separated. In some
reference frames the positive outcome occurs first; in others the negative outcome
occurs first. The two different sequences are associated with two distinct accounts:
(1) the positive outcome collapsed the wave function, setting the amplitude of the
alternate branch to zero, insuring a negative outcome for the other measurement; (2)
the negative outcome collapsed the wave function so that all of the amplitude was
concentrated in the other branch, insuring a detection.
Each of these sequences consists of a nondeterministic, irreversible event followed
by a deterministic, reversible one. The problem is that the order is switched, with the
positive outcome first in one account, and the negative outcome first in the other5.
The descriptions are observationally equivalent, but logically incompatible. To deal
5Treating the events as simultaneous does not work. See [23].
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with this conundrum many try to interpret quantum wave functions in a purely
epistemic way, but this approach is fraught with difficulties.
Conventional theory deals with this conflict by completely obscuring the boundary
between deterministic and nondeterministic effects. There is a better way. The non-
deterministic character of the effects, with its attendant irreversibility, is the source
of the problem, but it also provides the solution. In the same way that it prevents
acquisition of precise information about the state of individual elementary systems,
it also precludes detection of the sequence of spacelike-separated nonlocal effects.
To see this consider two particles in an entangled state, α|x1〉|x2〉 + β|y1〉|y2〉,
with |x〉 and |y〉 orthogonal. Suppose that they separate to a macroscopic distance
where they each encounter a series of ’detector’ particles arranged to interact with
the |x〉 branch. In [23] it was proposed that each such entangling interaction is
accompanied by a small, probabilistic nonlocal shift of squared amplitude either from
the interacting (|x〉) branch to the noninteracting (|y〉) branch of the wave function, or
vice versa. Assume that the magnitude of the shifts of squared amplitude is 0.01. The
state must be well defined at each stage of the process, so it is necessary to assume that
the spacelike-separated interactions involving the left and right moving particles are
sequenced in some fashion. Suppose that initially, we have αα∗ = ββ∗ = 0.5. Imagine
that after several hundred interactions have occurred on the left side, we take a ”God’s
eye” view of the quantum state. If the sequencing of right and left side interactions
is random, then we would expect that the nonlocal transfers from several hundred
right side interactions would have also affected the state up to this point. Suppose
that αα∗ is now 0.75. On average this would mean that about 252 = 625 transfers
have occurred. The point is that this state is the only physical record of the sequence
of nonlocal effects, and it is perfectly consistent with over 2300 different sequences.
If we were to add some other kinds of interactions to ”watch” the process we would
introduce additional entangling interactions with additional nondeterminstic effects.
There is no way to record which one of the enormous number of possible sequences
actually occurred. They are observationally equivalent.
Relativity should be understood as a statement of this observational equivalence,
and, to a large extent, as a consequence of the inherently nondeterministic nature
of elementary interactions. The nondeterminism entails limits on the kinds of infor-
mation that can be instantiated in physical systems, and so it regulates the ways in
which information can be transmitted. Relativity does not rule out either nonlocal
effects or the sequencing of those effects. It is an expression of the fact that there can
be no physical record of such sequencing.
Our view of the status of spacetime structure should be just as tentative and
provisional as our attitude toward quantum wave functions. Introductory relativity
texts typically talk about how reference frames are defined with respect to measuring
rods and clocks. In an address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences on January 27,
1921, Einstein said:
”All practical geometry is based upon...experience... Suppose two marks
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have been put upon a practically-rigid rod. A pair of two such marks we
shall call a tract. We imagine two practically-rigid bodies, each with a
tract marked on it. These two tracts are said to be ’equal to one another’
if the marks of the one tract can be brought to coincide permanently with
the marks of the other.”
He made a similar point about measurements of time with reference to clocks.
Compare this to a statement of Landau[24] on interpreting the predictions of
quantum theory:
”The ... quantitative description of the motion of an electron requires
the presence also of physical objects which obey classical mechanics to a
sufficient degree of accuracy.”
Now, restate Einstein’s point in Landau’s language:
”The ... [specification of a reference frame] requires the presence also of
physical objects which obey classical mechanics to a sufficient degree of
accuracy.”
The definition of reference frames and the interpretation of wave functions are
dependent on the same physical objects, subject to the same physical laws. It is
physical theory, taken as a whole, that is ”relativistic” - not one particular aspect
of that theory. Whether through genetic endowment or constant habituation, nature
has equipped us with deep intuitions about how the world works. These intuitions,
together with the historical path of discovery, have induced us to grant spacetime
geometry a special status. Our intellectual apparatus is aimed, largely, at figuring out
what we can control, so it is somewhat understandable that nature has not inclined
us to more readily consider possible nondeterministic aspects of our world. But, in
order to make current theory logically coherent, we need to realize that relativity is
rooted as much in the indeterminism that characterizes quantum theory as in the
structure of space and time.
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